the lower kind, that is, that we look on desires or goods from the lower kind 'with contempt'. It is essential to contempt that the claims presented by desires or goods of the lower kind do not differ merely in degree from those of the higher. Contempt requires at least an implicit acknowledgment of the incommensurability of some goods. It is not that elements from the higher domain count more, or are weighted more, than those of the latter; rather, they have a difference in status and play a different role in practical reasoning. 3 Again, to say that we have contempt for a thing, is to suggest that we in some sense appreciate its attraction, but that we reject it as having that attraction. 4 We are furthermore distant in some way from that for which we have contempt: the contemptible is not something we identify with, and we therefore gain control and some degree of mastery over something, by holding it in contempt.
We said that the attitude of contempt presupposes a ranking. There are various ways in which such a ranking can be understood: goods or desires of the higher sort might articulate an 'ideal', for instance, relative to which those of the lower sort are judged admissible or not; or, more strongly, the higher sort might be regarded as ranked lexically above the lower (see Taylor 1997, esp. 176 ). But it is not necessary to decide among these interpretations here, since Plato is more interested in what follows from denying such a ranking, than in explaining the exact nature of the ranking.
Plato early on attributes to Socrates the view that the ability to have the right sort of contempt is essential to having virtue. He has Socrates say in Apology 28b-e, in defense of his own course of action, and his own conduct in the trial, that 'a man should not attend (Ípolog¤zesyai) to danger in living or dying…but look to this alone, when he acts: whether his actions are just or unjust, and whether they are the deeds of a good man or those a bad man'. To illustrate this, Socrates approvingly cites Achilles as someone who 'showed such contempt for danger, in comparison with enduring anything disgraceful' (tosoËton toË kindÊnou katefrÒnhsen parå tÚ afisxrÒn ti Ípome›nai) that he rejected without consideration his mother's plea, that he not try to avenge the death of Patroclus, 'treating death and danger as though they were nothing' (toË yanãtou ka‹ toË kindÊnou »lig≈rhse). 'Do you think he gave any thought to death and danger? (mØ aÈtÚn o ‡ei front¤sai yanãtou ka‹ kindÊnou;)', Socrates asks in conclusion.
In this passage, to show contempt for something is 'to pay no heed to it' (Ípolog¤zesyai), 'to despise it' (kayafrone›n), or 'to count it as nought' (Ùligvre›n). Socrates asserts that considerations of justice and virtue should be ranked higher than those of security and danger, so that we should choose the former in contempt of the latter, when they might conflict. Note that in this part of the Apology there is even some suggestion that contempt for death simply is virtue: someone who has contempt for death, a fortiori, will have contempt for any other inducement opposed to virtue; and anyone who could not show contempt for death would lack virtue, since he would always be liable to 'desert his post', precisely through the fear of death (29a1-2). 5 The theme of contempt of death continues throughout the Apology: consider, for instance, Socrates' strong statement at 32d1-2, that his refusal to comply with the unjust order of the Thirty showed, in deeds, that he 'didn't care one whit about his death' ( §mo‹ yanãtou m¢n m°lei…oÈdÉ ıtioËn). Socrates of course also displays such contempt in the very way he conducted his defense, which the jury interpreted as contempt of them, and of their power to decide his fate-a misunderstanding that Socrates tries to forestall, by saying that he is aware that he might appear arrogant (aÈyadizÒmenow, 34d9) or contemptuous (étimãzvn, 34e1). 6 But then contempt is a continuing preoccupation of Plato: for instance, he develops a ranking of goods, which might serve as a precondition of contempt, in the refutation of Polus in the Gorgias, where considerations of nobility and shamefulness (tÚ kalÚn ka‹ tÚ afisxrÒn) have priority over those of pleasure and pain. The ascent passage in the Symposium takes contempt to be an achievement of someone who has made sufficient progress along the scala amoris, since someone who comes to love something at a higher level, which is timi≈teron, becomes capable of dismissing with contempt something at a lower level (cf. katafronAEsanta ka‹ smikrÚn ≤ghsãmenon, 210b5-6). And Plato's resolve, in Republic x, to banish the imitative arts from the ideal city, seems to spring from a concern that the imitative arts lead us to 'nurture and water' desires in us which should simply be dismissed (606d).
In each of these cases Plato is concerned, also, to establish what might be called 'the metaphysical basis of contempt'-that is to say, that fundamental picture of the world, which must be correct, if contempt is to be reasonable. In the Symposium, that picture is simply the scale of more perfect participation in the Forms by particulars; in the Republic, it is the hierarchy marked out by the Divided Line and explained allegorically by the Cave. 7 But in the Phaedo, my 103 5 In saying that Plato is evidently testing out the idea that contempt of death is a necessary and sufficient condition for virtue, I do not mean to suggest, of course, that he regarded such contempt as eo ipso sufficient for virtue. I mean, rather, that Plato was prone to regard such contempt as sufficient for virtue, given certain background conditions-one of which, I would suppose, is that there are features of any kalÒn action, which make it a kalÒn action and therefore the sort of thing that a virtuous person would do: say, it is kalÒn because it is fitting, or equal, or in some way balanced and symmetrical, or suitably proportionate, or the sort of thing that would fit within some ideal community of gods and righteous human beings (an ideal by which Socrates seems to guide himself in the Phaedo, and which Plato explicitly regards as a kind of paradigm of human laws, in the Laws, see 739d-e). As Gorgias 507a-508a indicates, Plato was prone to see virtue as what fits a human being into a prior order, observed by the gods, which is quasi-mathematical in character.
concern here, it is substance dualism, and Plato's view in that dialogue, as we shall see, seems to be something like the following: a person can have true virtue just in case he is capable of the right sort of contempt; but he can maintain that sort of contempt, only if he recognizes that the soul is a substance really distinct from the body, and that he is his soul; thus, that someone recognize the truth of dualism is a sole condition of his having true virtue.
I shall be concerned with a sequence of three texts: (i) Socrates' Defense (Phaedo 63b4-69e5), where Socrates presents a defense to Simmias and Cebes, as if to a jury, against the imagined charge that his lack of concern over his imminent execution displays a censurable lack of self-regard; 8 (ii) a text which I shall call the 'Virtue Passage', which occurs at 68b8-69a4, near the end of Socrates' Defense, in which Socrates argues that a person has the cardinal virtues just in case he is a 'true philosopher'; and (iii) the text on the 'Right Exchange', 69a6-c3, which immediately follows the Virtue Passage, and which has occasioned much commentary in the secondary literature, 9 where Socrates apparently contrasts a right and a wrong way of exchanging present goods for future or more important benefits. I shall presume that a correct understanding of (iii) depends on a sound interpretation of (ii), which in turn requires our having arrived at a just assessment of (i), to which I therefore first turn.
Socrates' Defense
Typically it is thought that Socrates' Defense is merely literary or rhetorical, that it professes Socrates 'faith' in the immortality of the soul, perhaps, but that the substantive, philosophical argument of the Phaedo actually begins after Socrates's Defense, when Socrates introduces the so-called 'Cyclical Argument'. I take a different approach and understand Socrates' Defense itself to be doing philosophical work. Socrates' Defense, I maintain, is meant to establish the initial and intuitive plausibility of substance dualism, 10 which is then presupposed by the subsequent arguments of the dialogue. The chief question guiding the Phaedo, on this way of looking at things, then becomes, not whether we have souls which are capable of continuing to exist after the destruction of the body, 104 8 The 'charge' is articulated at 63b8-9, that Socrates is acting wrongly by not trying to resist his own death (±d¤koun ín oÈk éganakt«n t" yanãtƒ); and the chief plank of Socrates' defense against that charge, is that he has good reason to expect that he will join with the gods, and with better men than those who are currently his friends, after he has died (parå yeoÁw êllouw sofoÊw te ka‹ égayoÊw, ¶peita ka‹ parÉ ényr≈pouw teteleuthkÒtaw éme¤nouw t«n §nyãde, 63b7-8). See the repetition of the charge at the conclusion of the defense, at 69d8, and the repetition of Socrates' chief claim at 69e1-2.
9 See especially Gooch 1974 , Luce 1944 , Rowe 1993 , ad loc., and Weiss 1987 but rather, given that we do have souls of that sort, do they in fact continue to exist very long, and, in particular, can it be shown that they continue to exist forever? 11 Socrates' Defense establishes the initial and intuitive plausibility of the independent existence of the soul through an argument not unlike Descartes' argument for a real distinction. Plato presupposes that the independent existence of the soul is possible if it is conceivable, or adequately defined. But it is conceivable, or adequately defined, if some activity can be assigned to the soul 'alone by itself', that is, if there is some activity in which the soul can engage without using the body as an instrument.
Socrates and his interlocutors quickly identify and put aside activities of the soul which clearly require the body-eating, drinking, and sex (64c). They then turn to the activity of 'thinking' (frÒnhsiw) and consider whether it requires the body: 'What about our attaining to thinking? Is the body an obstacle to it, or not?' (65a9). They presuppose that thinking is a kind of perception of something-they refer to it as a 'grasping' or 'touching' of the truth (t∞w élhye¤aw ëptetai, 65b7), 'a viewing of the truest nature of things' (tÚ élhy°staton yevre›tai, e2). Therefore-they reason-if thinking were something that we accomplished through the body, it would be accomplished through those parts of the body that serve as instruments of perception, the familiar five senses. However, from the experience of thinking-Socrates and his interlocutors agree-it turns out that one succeeds better at thinking, the less use one makes of sense perceptions and images derived from sense perception: 'That man would come to the purest knowledge of each thing, who, as much as possible, came to each thing with his reason alone (aÈtª tª diano¤a), not introducing sight into his thinking, or dragging in any other sense along with his reasoning part, but who, making use of his reason alone by itself in purity (aÈtª kayÉ aÍtØn efilikrine› tª diano¤& xr≈menow), tried to hunt down each thing by itself in purity ' (65e6-66a3) . 12 Thinking, therefore, in its purest form, does not make use of images. But images are supplied through the sense organs; hence, thinking does not make use of sense organs. But the sense organs are the only bodily instruments of perception; hence, reasoning in its purest form does not make use of the body at all. Thus, thinking is an activity in which the soul can engage without the assistance of the body. 13 Socrates and his interlocutors arrive at a notion of pure thinking by making an extrapolation from, or idealization of, our better and worse efforts at thinking: if we think better to the extent that our thinking is shorn of distracting senseimages, then the best and clearest case of thinking would be that which is entirely 105 shorn of sense-images. But such would be thinking that was carried out independently of the function of the sense organs. We can conceive of this sort of activity, and we can define it as the limit of our better efforts at thinking; thus this sort of activity is possible; thus the soul is distinct from the body and, in principle, capable of existing upon the destruction of the body: nothing hinders the soul from thinking, when the body is destroyed, because it is not by means of the body that it thinks, even when the body is animated. 14 The argument is of course undergirded by the introduction of the Forms. We might wonder why the Forms are introduced at all in Socrates' Defense. In fact they are introduced in an oblique and almost mysterious way, as the 'being' (t∞w oÈs¤aw, 65d13) and 'truest reality' of things (tÚ élhy°staton, e2). We may surmise that the manner of their introduction points to the purpose of their introduction. The Forms are introduced for the limited purpose of providing content to Socrates' notion of 'thinking' and of the soul: pure thinking is simply activity of the soul that has the Forms as its object; and the soul may be understood essentially as a capacity to perceive the Forms. And that Forms are the object of thinking furthermore suggests that that activity does not properly belong to something corporeal: 'it would never be permissible for the impure to have contact with the pure' (mØ kayar" går kayaroË §fãptesyai mØ oÈ yemitÚn ¬, 67b2, see again Pakaluk 2003) .
That the soul has an activity all its own, distinct from any activity in which it can engage using the body as an instrument, is crucial to the central line of thought in Socrates' Defense. Socrates had been challenged by his friends to explain why it was reasonable for him not to be disturbed by the prospect of his own death. Should he not have done more to avoid it? Should he not even now resist its approach? To Simmias, Cebes, and the others, Socrates might have seemed to be carrying on with a censurable lack of regard for his own welfare. So Socrates presents a mock 'defense' as if to the jury, to justify his attitude. His defense, in effect, is that he cares little for his 'life' in one sense, because he cares about his 'life' in another sense. What philosophers have discovered, in coming to see that thinking is the activity of the soul 'alone by itself', is that there is an entirely distinct activity of the soul, which is unknown to the many; and, in pursuing and favoring this sort of life, philosophers might seem to be indifferent as to what is popularly called 'life'.
Take living to be activity of the soul. Then-Socrates is maintaining-there are two kinds of living: activity of the soul which requires the body (such as eating, drinking, and sense perception, and the enjoyment of pleasures that arise from these); and activity of the soul which the soul can carry out 'alone by itself', without the assistance of the body, and to which, even, the body proves a hindrance. Socrates's defense is that his indifference as to whether he ceases to live in the first sense is not censurable, because his aim throughout life has been to develop and increase his living in the second sense. Since (we are to assume) Socrates really is his soul, and thinking is therefore the activity that is his above all, then Socrates has in fact been displaying proper self love, in paying little heed to his life in the usual sense; by implication, most people, who fail to recognize this activity, fail to love themselves at all. 15 Note that the theme, that a philosopher has contempt for the condition of the body, its pleasures and good states, is introduced at the very beginning of Socrates' Defense and runs throughout that passage. A true philosopher, Socrates maintains, has contempt for the body and for those activities of the soul that evidently involve the body: he has no regard for the care of the body ( §nt¤mouw ≤ge›syai, 64d8); he despises (étimãzein, e1) adornments of the body; and he cares nothing (mhd¢n front¤zvn, 65a6) for those pleasures that come through the soul's activity jointly with the body. The same holds as well of the activity of sense perception: 'Then in these matters, too,' Socrates insists, 'the soul of the philosopher greatly despises the body (mãlista étimãzei tÚ s«ma) and flees from it, and seeks to become alone by itself?' (65d1-2). In short, the recognition and esteem for the activity of the soul 'alone by itself' goes hand-in-hand with the capacity to show contempt for goods procurable through the activity of the soul using the body as an instrument.
The Virtue Passage
If such is the background provided by Socrates' Defense, then how should we understand the Virtue Passage? Socrates (or Plato) is presuming that each person is going to regard his own life, well lived, as the ultimate end of his action. Socrates' Defense, however, has opened up two candidates for what counts as 'one's own life, well lived'. The first is the only sort of life that most people recognize, namely, that involving activity of the soul that requires the body as an instrument: life that manifests itself in sense perceptions and bodily pleasures. The second is the sort of life that only 'true philosophers' have discovered and pursue: that of the soul, 'alone by itself', thinking about the true realities, the Forms.
Socrates is wont to say that someone who takes the first sort of life as his ultimate end cares above all for 'the body': such a person is a 'body-lover', a filos≈matow (68c1). A 'body-lover' is someone who loves the body rather than the soul, because he esteems only those activities of the soul in which the body plays a role. For such a person, that the soul is operating in conjunction with the body is a condition of his finding anything loveable in the soul at all. Socrates takes this to be a love properly for the body, presumably on analogy with love for another: a person who loves his friend only on the condition (say) that his friend is wealthy may be said properly to have love for his friend's money, not his friend. 16 Someone who, in contrast, regards the second sort of life as his ultimate end cares above all for the soul, but Socrates calls such a person, not a 'soul lover', as we might expect, but rather a 'wisdom lover', filÒsofow (68c1). The reason for this, presumably, is that Socrates is presupposing that love of the soul involves loving it for what it itself is and does: the soul is essentially the capacity to think of the Forms, and its characteristic activity is simply activity of that sort. A lover of the soul is therefore a 'thinking-lover': he is 'in love with thinking' (≥rvn d¢ fronAEsevw, 68a2); he is 'thinking's true love' (fronAEsevw d¢ êra tiw t" ˆnti §r«n, a7). Socrates takes frÒnhsiw to be sof¤a, 17 since he reasons that a 'true philosopher' (t" ˆnti filÒsofow, b2-3) must be a true lover of thinking (see a68-b4). Hence, on this line of thought, a soul-lover is a wisdom-lover.
We should note the equivocation in Socrates' use of the terms frÒnhsiw and sof¤a. As we have seen, elsewhere in Socrates' Defense frÒnhsiw means simply, as we have explained, thinking (log¤zesyai, 65c2, dianoe›syai, e8), or the activity of the soul 'alone by itself'. In this sense it could not be identified with any virtue of wisdom. It is of course implausible to take the mere activity of thinking to be a virtue: we would want to say, at least, that the virtue involves a habit of thinking, or the organizing of one's life so that thinking is possible. In fact Socrates prefers to construe the virtue as the love of thinking-above all, as being the life of one's true self. 18 So we need to distinguish two senses of 'wisdom' (frÒnhsiw, sof¤a) in these passages: (i) wisdom as meaning simply the activity of the soul in thinking; and (ii) wisdom as meaning the love of this sort of activity over anything else of which the soul is capable. Call these the 'activity of frÒnhsiw' and the 'love of frÒnhsiw', respectively. Yet the equivocation might justifiably have been overlooked by Plato, since he would have found it easy to agree that the love of wisdom (in one sense) is itself wisdom (in another sense). 19 Socrates' Defense, then, in revealing the soul as a distinct and independent substance, is meant to reveal also two fundamentally distinct forms of life, which are at odds with each other. Once the activity of the soul 'alone by itself' has been discovered, then a person is faced with a choice as if between God and Mammon: either he loves his soul, by loving its proper activity above all, and consequently has contempt for the body, or he loves his body and neglects or despises his soul. A 'true philosopher' by definition loves his soul; everyone else loves his body above all, in the sense explained.
Socrates wishes to argue that having the virtues or not is correlated with this 108 16 But note that the term filos≈matow carries with it the suggestion: 'loving his own body in the first instance, but generally being drawn to things bodily'and thus (Plato thinks) binding one's soul to future cycles of reincarnation. (I owe this observation to Catherine Osborne.) 17 Gallop, indeed, typically renders frÒnhsiw as 'wisdom'. 18 Hence the facility with which Socrates likens philosophy to romantic love for a person, as at 68a2-b2. 19 Of course in the Apology Socrates maintains that it is a sort of wisdom to recognize that one lacks wisdom. Note too the general preference in Plato for filÒsofow over sofÒw or sofistAEw.
choice: a person has the virtues if and only if he is a true philosopher. He takes the virtues to be enumerated by the standard list of cardinal virtues: wisdom (frÒnhsiw); courage (éndre¤a); chastened and controlled appetite, or 'temperance' (svfrosÊnh); and justice (dikaiosÊnh). So he wants to show, for each of these virtues, a pair of claims having the form:
A. If x is a true philosopher, then x has ___________ (a sufficiency claim). B. If x has ____________, then x is a true philosopher (a necessity claim). where some cardinal virtue is mentioned in the blank space.
That this pair of claims holds good as regards the virtue of wisdom is trivial, since to have the virtue of wisdom is to love frÒnhsiw, and Socrates, as we have seen, takes (the activity of) frÒnhsiw to be equivalent to (the activity of) sof¤a. He gives a terse argument for the A. direction at 68b: a true philosopher, by the meaning of the word filÒsofow, simply is a lover of wisdom, but (the activity of) wisdom is frÒnhsiw; thus he is a lover of frÒnhsiw (68b). 20 The B. direction would similarly hold true simply by the meaning of the words, as Socrates has been using them. So Socrates next argues for the relevant pair of claims as regards courage and temperance. In effect, the burden of the Virtue Passage is to show that the cardinal virtues besides wisdom hinge on wisdom, understood as the love of frÒnhsiw.
His arguments that a true philosopher has these virtues (the A. direction) hinge on the notion of contempt: a true philosopher loves above all the life of the soul alone by itself; therefore he has contempt for the pleasures of the body (Ùlig≈rvw ¶xein, 68c10), and for the joining of the soul to the body that is the condition for these; therefore, he takes considerations of what is 'orderly' (and presumably kalÒn) to trump those of bodily life or pleasure, when they conflict; but that is just what it is to have those virtues. The virtues follow not merely from one's taking the activity of the soul 'alone by itself' as one's true life, so much as from the contempt for the other sort of life, which results: 'the condition of not being keen about one's appetites (tÚ per‹ tåw §piyum¤aw mØ §pto∞syai), but rather of having the posture of holding these in contempt and, consequently, remaining well-ordered (éllÉ Ùlig≈rvw ¶xein, ka‹ kosm¤vw), is a condition that is proper only to those who hold the body in utter contempt (to›w mãlista toË s≈matow ÙligvroËsin) and live a life that consists of a love of wisdom ( §n filosof¤& z«sin)' (68c8-12).
Socrates is meant to be a living example of these inferences. By willingly remaining in prison and accepting the death sentence, he is letting a consideration of right-which seems scrupulous to Crito and the others-trump a concern for his bodily life, thus showing éndre¤a; and he displays svfrosÊnh in not indulging his emotion of self-pity, not weeping, and, at the end of the day, not clinging to pleasures and trying to extend his life as long as possible. 21 Socrates' argument for the second sort of claim (the B. direction) for these virtues proceeds deductively (68d5-69a4). If 'the others', that is, those who are not true philosophers, love above all the life that the soul carries out using the body as an instrument-which they must, if they have neither identified nor come to esteem the activity of the soul 'alone by itself'-then, by the nature of the case, such persons are simply incapable of choosing anything above their own life, if these should conflict, or, when death is not a possibility, of holding back from pursuing the most pleasant course of action. By the nature of the case, they could not allow, for instance, a consideration of the shamefulness of a pleasure to count as a reason against choosing that pleasure.
In Nicomachean Ethics iii 8.1116a29-36, Aristotle gives an example of a spurious form of courage: soldiers who remain at their positions on the front line only because their commanding officer is standing at the rear, ready to beat and kill anyone who abandons his post. Socrates is in effect claiming: this must be the way to construe the action of any non-philosopher who remains at his post when death threatens (tÚn yãnaton Ípom°nein, cf. 68d9). Plato says that this phenomenon is 'strange' (êtopow, d3) and 'inconsistent' (êlogon, d12) because such a person is 'courageous by reason of his fear and cowardice' (t" dedi°nai êra ka‹ d°ei éndre›o¤ efisi pãntew plØn ofl filÒsofoi, d11-12). What is strange is that someone who has an attribute may nonetheless appear to have the opposite attribute. We are intended to resolve the apparent inconsistency by following Socrates' argument and agreeing that such a person's courage is merely apparent. 22 Socrates' point is the mundane one, that the principle of non-contradiction excludes our attributing courage simultaneously to those who, we know, are acting from cowardice. 23 Similarly, when death and dying are not at issue, the only grounds on which a non-philosopher can resist a bodily pleasure, by the nature of the case, is that his doing so will lead to more pleasures of that sort. Plato thinks that we can predict that such persons, 'body lovers', will act badly whenever the requisite motives are lacking, which may of course include incentives and punishments supplied by 110 death is imminent is one of decorous silence and self-control (cf. éllÉ ≤sux¤an te êgete ka‹ kartere›te, 117e2). 22 Bostock 1986, 31 objects to the Virtue Passage: 'Suppose I am thirsty, but abstain from drinking the weedkiller through fear of death, and instead go off to get a drink of water. Surely that is not a case of cowardice?' But so far Bostock has imagined a case where no real motive is required. Suppose, rather, that you are very thirsty (you have been in the desert for days), and the weedkiller is actually very tasty. In that case some rather strong, opposing motive is required, if you are not to drink it. Yet suppose you find that the only thing keeping you from drinking is the negative consideration that you would thereby cease to live. Certainly such a person would have, at best, only low or impoverished motives available to him. And Plato does not say, in any case, that body-lovers appear to be cowardly: he claims that they in fact are cowardly, despite appearances.laws and social conventions. 24 A brief aside on the virtue of justice, dikaiosÊnh: It is noteworthy that Socrates says nothing explicitly about how this virtue follows from filosof¤a, though later he asserts that it does (see 69b2, c2). 25 We may take Plato to be presuming that justice is present or not depending upon whether courage and temperance are. This at least seems to be the import of the apparently 'throw away' remark at the beginning of the Virtue Passage, 68c1-3. Socrates there says that a person who does not recognize and esteem the activity of a soul 'alone by itself', and is therefore a 'body lover', will consequently be, in addition, either a 'lover of money' (filoxrAEmatow), a 'lover of distinction' (filÒtimow), or both (68c2). We can easily see why Socrates would claim this: money and distinction are the ordinary means by which one procures bodily pleasures and comforts. (We should understand filotim¤a as a seeking of distinction precisely as a guarantee of future good treatment.) Now Plato is wont to identify this pair of motives as those that principally induce people to act unjustly. 26 Remove them, then-as they would be removed, Socrates thinks, if the life of the embodied soul is not making the first claim on our affections-and presumably justice falls out as a consequence. 27 These considerations, then, provide the basis for the A. and B. claims as regards justice. The A. direction: if someone is a true philosopher, then he will have contempt for bodily goods and find considerations of rightness and fairness decisive for action. The B. direction: if someone has justice, then he is not motivated by love of money or distinction, but this implies that he does not love the body above all, and thus he must love something else more, i.e., he is a philosopher. 111 24 Note that Glaucon's worry would follow directly from this: the ring of Gyges neutralizes the effect of such superadded incentives and punishments. 25 Both of these passages assert only the A. direction apparently-that justice follows from being a true philosopher. 26 For instance, Laws 938b5-c5 implies that filonik¤a (which Plato frequently uses as an equivalent of filotim¤a) and filoxrhmat¤a are the only two possible motives underlying an injustice; Rep. 581c3-5, not unlike the Phaedo, presumes that there are only three motives on which human beings can act (diå taËta dØ ka‹ ényr≈pvn l°gomen tå pr«ta trittå g°nh e‰nai, filÒsofon, filÒnikon, filokerd°w;), and compare also 586d4-e3. 27 Bostock 1986, 34 objects: 'The virtues of courage and temperance are in fact untypical, and are often distinguished as "self-regarding" virtues, since they can perfectly well be manifested in actions which do not affect other people. But most virtues are "other-regarding", and essentially concern one's behavior to others. These virtues it seems that our philosopher will lack altogether. At any rate the temptation to act only with his own ends in view is a temptation he will certainly have, and apparently he will see no reason to resist it'. But, again, we must be taking Plato to be presuming that there are some sorts of actions that befit intelligent beings in their relationship to one another, and are therefore worth choosing-the realm of what is kalÒn (see n5). Contempt of embodied life, he therefore presumes, will lead to 'other regarding' virtue by making it possible for considerations of what is kalÒn to be decisive for action.
The Right Exchange
On the reading of the Virtue Passage that I have been developing, we must take Socrates' remarks in the passage on the 'Right Exchange' to be parasitical and derivative. That is, in characteristic fashion, Plato is simply introducing a striking metaphor or analogy, to represent something that he has already proposed argumentatively.
Socrates has been drawing a distinction between the genuine virtues of 'true philosophers' and the spurious virtues of everyone else. What makes it seem that non-philosophers have the virtues, is that they do in fact sacrifice or reject goods: even non-philosophers will reject pleasures, and they will reject safety (when they freely expose themselves to dangers), thus mimicking, Socrates thinks, the temperance and courage of true philosophers. But the nature of this rejection of goods differs fundamentally in the two cases. The reason is that non-philosophers reject goods only in order to procure goods that are similar in kind, whereas philosophers reject goods or one sort in order to procure goods that are of an incommensurably higher sort. As we have seen, Socrates thinks that, because philosophers have come to recognize and value the activity of the soul 'alone by itself', which is ranked incommensurably higher than goods procured through the activity of the soul together with the body, they are therefore capable of having a proper contempt for the latter sort of goods and can reject them decisively, when such goods would conflict with the good of the soul on its own.
The distinction between these two types of rejection is nicely brought out by the imagery of commercial exchange. Let us say that, when someone rejects X in order to procure Y, then he has 'exchanged X for Y' or 'purchased Y with X'. Then the first type of rejection is modeled nicely by market transactions: to reject a good of one sort, in order to procure a commensurable good, is analogous to making a purchase to acquire something that similarly has commercial value. A person may, by shrewd buying and selling, increase his wealth, but he will never obtain, by those means alone, anything other than wealth.
The second type of rejection-that of which a true philosopher is capable-is modeled, not by market transactions, but rather by the way in which we would immediately trade any amount of counterfeit money for genuine money. As we have seen, Plato's view is that lower ranked goods, when they conflict with higher ranked goods, have no worth: they should be dismissed with contempt. But similarly counterfeit money, whatever its uses elsewhere, has no worth when there is a choice between it and genuine money: it should be traded for genuine money without hesitation. A true philosopher, because he has recognized and come to esteem the activity of the soul 'alone by itself', recognizes and loves a good that is incommensurably greater than any good attained by the activity of the soul using the body as an instrument. He alone, then, is capable of rejecting goods in the decisive way in which we dispense with counterfeit money.
For Plato, contempt is a prerequisite for the decisive rejection of, and therefore control over, bodily goods of the sort that we expect to see in the manifestations of true virtue. But this attitude of contempt cannot be taken for granted; it is not available to everyone. Rather, it is an achievement, which requires an ability to draw a certain sort of contrast between goods. We become capable of drawing that contrast precisely by discovering higher goods, in relation to which the goods we had until then recognized, seem to be dispensable. In the Phaedo, as was said, the higher good that the philosopher has discovered is the soul as independently existing, capable of acting 'alone by itself'.
With the argument thus recast, we are now in a position to give an account of 69a6-c2, which has received much attention in the secondary literature. That passage, although obscure when read on its own, is relatively straightforward if seen, in the manner explained, as a continuation of the line of thought of Socrates' Defense and the Virtue Passage.
(1) 69a6-b1. OE makãrei Simm¤a, mØ går oÈx aÏth ¬ ≤ ÙryØ prÚw éretØn éllagAE, ≤donåw prÚw ≤donåw ka‹ lÊpaw prÚw lÊpaw ka‹ fÒbon prÚw fÒbon katallãttesyai, ka‹ me¤zv prÚw §lãttv Àsper nom¤smata, éllÉ ¬ §ke›no mÒnon tÚ nÒmisma ÙryÒn, ént‹ o de› pãnta taËta katallãttesyai, frÒnhsiw, Here Socrates simply draws the contrast, just explained, between the two types of rejection of goods, or two types of 'exchanges': that in which a good is rejected to procure something commensurable to it, and that in which goods of a lower sort are rejected with contempt, in favor of goods of a higher sort. The former is what is found in spurious virtue, as just explained (hence aÏth). The latter requires the love above all else of frÒnhsiw, the activity of the soul 'alone by itself'.
(2) 69b1-5. ka‹ toÊtou m¢n pãnta ka‹ metå toÊtou »noÊmenã te ka‹ pipraskÒmena t" ˆnti ¬ ka‹ éndre¤a ka‹ svfrosÊnh ka‹ dikaiosÊnh, ka‹ sullAEbdhn élhyØw éretAE metå fronAEsevw, ka‹ proshignom°nvn ka‹ épogignom°nvn ka‹ ≤don«n ka‹ fÒbvn ka‹ t«n êllvn pãntvn t«n toioÊtvn: Luce 1944 seems to be correct that Socrates has in mind two steps, or moments, in the virtuous activity of a true philosopher, as indicated first by toÊtou pãnta and then by metå toÊtou, but the interpretation so far sketched gives a natural interpretation of these steps: take toÊtou pãnta (sc. »noÊmenã te ka‹ pipraskÒmena) to refer to the true philosopher's aim to foster frÒnhsiw, or the activity of the soul 'alone by itself', which comes of his taking frÒnhsiw to be what living is for him; take metå toÊtou to signify the indifference he consequently shows toward other goods, and hence their subjection to considerations of what is kalÒn, given that he has and fosters frÒnhsiw. Since a true philosopher has contempt for pleasures, fears, and other goods commensurable to these (ka‹ t«n êllvn pãntvn t«n toioÊtvn), it makes no difference whether they come or go-so long as he has what is truly valuable (that is, he is metå fronAEsevw).
Note that on the interpretation developed here, ka‹ sullAEbdhn élhyØw éretAE metå fronAEsevw should be punctuated as above and stand as an independent clause. 28 The reason is that, as we have seen, Plato wishes to argue that being a true philosopher, that is, someone's having identified and fostered frÒnhsiw, is both sufficient and necessary, in the sense explained, for genuine virtue. Now xvrizÒmena ktl., which follows immediately, is clearly the statement of a necessity condition. So it is natural to take ka‹ sullAEbdhn élhyØw éretAE metå fronAEsevw as expressing a sufficiency condition, that is: if frÒnhsiw, then élhyØw éretAE. But that is just the sense of the text, when it is taken as an independent clause. And then it is natural to take ka‹ prosgignom°nvn ktl. as a further expression of the sufficiency of frÒnhsiw (or, rather, the love of frÒnhsiw) for virtue. 29 Furthermore, we should take sullAEbdhn to summarize something that comes before, and ka‹ sullAEbdhn élhyØw éretAE metå fronAEsevw would nicely summarize the sufficiency argument Socrates had argued for earlier at some length. But if one takes it to summarize merely the list of virtues, then one member of that list, frÒnhsiw, is mentioned, gratuitously so, immediately after the supposed summary, which is awkward.
Moreover, surely élhyAEw, 69b3, is meant to express the same idea as t" ˆnti, b2. Now call an expression such as éndre¤a an unqualified (and hence potentially ambiguous) reference to a virtue, but an expression such as t" ˆnti éndre¤a or élhyØw éndre¤a as a qualified reference. If we understand sullAEbdhn, as on the standard reading, to be summarizing a list, then, since the items on the list are unqualified, the occurrence of élhyAEw would be otiose: that work would already have been done by t" ˆnti earlier. On the other hand, given that we do find élhyAEw, then it should be playing a role like that of t" ˆnti; yet it can do that only if we take sullAEbdhn to be qualifying the clause, as in the interpretation defended here.
(3) 69b5-8. xvrizÒmena d¢ fronAEsevw ka‹ éllattÒmena ént‹ éllAElvn mØ skiagraf¤a tiw ¬ ≤ toiaÊth éretØ ka‹ t" nti éndrapod≈dhw te ka‹ oÈd¢n Ígi¢w oÈdÉ élhy¢w ¶x˙. Here is a summary of the argument that the fostering of frÒnhsiw is necessary for genuine virtue. Note that, with Socrates now contrasting élhyØw éretAE with skiagraf¤a, Plato has shifted to a new image. The language of 'exchange' has come to an end with éllattÒmena ént‹ éllAElvn; hence, strictly, b6 marks the end of the passage on the 'right exchange '. 30 Looking back, we can see that the 'right exchange' passage consists, simply, of three passages: (1) a passage (69a6-b1) which contrasts the two sorts of rejection of goods, displayed in spurious as opposed to true virtue; (2) a passage (b1-5) which summarizes the argument that frÒnhsiw or the love of frÒnhsiw, is sufficient for someone's correctly rejecting goods; and (3) a passage (b5-6) which summarizes the argument that frÒnhsiw, or the love of frÒnhsiw, is necessary for someone's correctly rejecting goods.
After this, Socrates shifts now to language suggestive of a contrast between appearance and reality, in order to elucidate, in another way, the difference in status between the higher good of frÒnhsiw and other goods. The new thought is this: the independent reality of the activity of thinking depends upon the existence of the Forms; but these differ from everything else in the way that truth differs from appearances; hence the difference between the genuine virtues of a true philosopher and the spurious virtues of everyone else, will amount similarly to the difference between truth and appearance. Ultimately the difference in kind among goods, necessary for contempt, is just the difference between truth and appearance; hence, a view of the world not capable of making out such a distinction is incapable of providing a basis for contempt.
(4) 69b8-c3. tÚ dÉ élhy¢w t" ˆnti ¬ kãyars¤w tiw t«n toioÊtvn pãntvn. ka‹ ≤ svfrosÊnh ka‹ ≤ dikaiosÊnh ka‹ éndre¤a, ka‹ aÈtØ ≤ frÒnhsiw mØ kayarmÒw tiw ¬. Here Plato shifts to a third image: that of purity and impurity. And this passage is followed by yet another (c3-d1), in which a contrast is drawn between those who have, and those who have not, been inititated into secret rites. So in this final speech in his mock defense, Socrates gives us a succession of four contrasts: (i) market exchanges vs. the exchange of counterfeit for genuine money; (ii) appearance vs. reality; (iii) impurity vs. purity; and (iv) uninitiated vs. initiated. All of these involve analogies, illustrating the distinction he had already drawn argumentatively.
We should presumably take tÚ dÉ élhy°w to be not something that is emphatically reduplicated by t" ˆnti, but rather a reference to Truth, the object of thinking and the end of a true philosopher's striving: compare similar assertions in Socrates's Defense, at 66b8, cf. 66a6, d7, 67b1. Hence to say tÚ dÉ élhy¢w t" nti ¬ kãyars¤w tiw t«n toioÊtvn pãntvn is to say that 'in fact, Truth is something set apart from corporeal existence': it is a lightly veiled assertion of the separate existence of the Forms. Then we may take ka‹ ≤ svfrosÊnh ka‹ ≤ dikaiosÊnh ka‹ éndre¤a, ka‹ aÈtØ ≤ frÒnhsiw mØ kayarmÒw tiw ¬ to be drawing the conclusion that, analogously and consequently, a virtue will be a condition of the soul that, similarly, separates the soul from the body-the chief theme of Socrates' Defense. frÒnhsiw is here mentioned separately because, as Socrates has argued, the separation of soul from body effected by the soul's thinking 'alone by itself' is constitutive of the separation displayed in the other virtues. This separation as displayed in the other virtues is, as we have seen, construed by Plato as a posture of contempt-a radical and decisive putting away of considerations having to do with the soul's activity in union with the body.
This line of thought concludes Plato's investigation of Socratic contempt, supplying what might be called the full 'metaphysical basis' for contempt as an expression of virtue: a person can adopt the posture of rejecting bodily goods, whenever they conflict with rational considerations, however slight, only on condition that he recognizes that there are goods entirely independent of bodily goods, and if he takes his proper life and activity to involve the possession of goods of that sort. The argument of the texts of the Phaedo that we have been examining, then, is that virtue involves the right sort of contempt, but that that sort of contempt is available only to someone who recognizes and esteems the soul as existing separately from the body.
Conclusion
Socratic magnanimity may be characterized as an exaltation of the soul over the body, which consists in a readiness to reject anything whatsoever that is incompatible with the indications of what is kalÒn. Plato, as we have seen, supposed that such an attitude required that a person be capable of drawing a distinction in kind among goods, so that not all goods are commensurable; and, in the Phaedo at least, he thinks that a person can draw such a distinction only if he distinguishes properly between body and soul. Straining with images to express his point, Plato maintains that to draw such a distinction, in our judgments and in our preference for frÒnhsiw over anything else, simply is for the soul to become distinct from the body: the judgments of a virtuous person, and his contempt, effect the distinction acknowledged by those judgments themselves. For Plato, then, magnanimity is a virtue that expresses, not simply by acknowledging but also by actually displaying, the power of the soul over the body.
For these reasons it is appropriate that Plato attempts to account for Socratic magnanimity in his dialogue on immortality: for the contempt of death that Socrates shows is meant to be direct evidence for the distinctness of his soul from his body, as much as for his courage-just as the argumentation of the dialogue, as a display of frÒnhsiw and the love of frÒnhsiw, is meant itself to be a participation in the discarnate existence, to which Socrates hopes to attain upon death. 31 Department of Philosophy Clark University Worcester MA 01610 116 31 This article was presented originally to the Eighth Annual Arizona Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy at the University of Arizona, February 2003. I should like to thank my commentator at that event, Ruby Blondell, for insightful comments, and, for remarks in discussion, Julia Annas, Jennifer Baker, Howard Curzer, Thomas Johansen, Rachana Kamtekar, Mark McPherran, and Catherine Osborne. Many thanks are also due to the anonymous reader of this journal and to Ron Polansky, for helpful editorial suggestions.
